Editorial: The abuse of Power, P-values and the Misnomer of Statistical “Testing” by Columb, Malachy O. & Minto, Gary
The page number in the footer is not for bibliographic referencingwww.tandfonline.com/ojaa 4
 Editorial
The abuse of Power, P-values and the Misnomer of Statistical “Testing”
In estimating the sample size in the design of a randomised controlled 
trial (RCT) certain assumptions are necessary. Critical amongst these is 
an educated guess as to how much difference the intervention might 
be expected to make and whether this will be of clinical importance. 
Typically, investigators will estimate a likely value for the defined 
primary outcome in the control group, and then decide what a clinically 
meaningful difference would be in the intervention group as the “effect 
size”. Roughly speaking, the larger the difference or effect size that the 
intervention is anticipated to make, the smaller the sample required for 
the study. 
In this edition of SAJAA Nontshe and colleagues closely compared 
estimated Minimum Clinically Important Difference (“MCID”) reported 
by authors in planning their sample sizes with the actual treatment 
effect found in the published study.1 This was done for all parallel group 
inequality RCTs with a single primary outcome published in the top five 
anaesthetic journals in 2014. It is surprising that only 28 papers made 
the final cut (of ~ 500 manuscripts published across those prestigious 
specialty journals in that year). However, the key point highlighted is that 
in all but 20% of the trials the actual treatment effect was substantially 
smaller than the estimation used in the apriori sample size calculations. 
In almost half of the trials the authors had estimated that the likely 
treatment effect would be double what was eventually reported. 
Moreover, a handful of the studies used one-sided P-values which 
reduce the sample size further. The use of one-sided hypothesis testing 
for superiority RCTs should be avoided and is rarely appropriate.2 In one 
of those one-sided hypothesis investigations the actual treatment effect 
was in the opposite direction to what was expected. 
The implication is that many of these studies were doomed to be 
underpowered from the outset. The issue is that researchers manipulate 
the power calculation to get a manageable sample size so that the trials 
will be approved and funded. Whilst the process of power and sample 
size calculations does encourage and allow researchers to balance 
expectations, this should not be at the cost of performing meaningful 
research with realistic and clinically meaningful outcomes. At worst this 
suggests that many clinical investigators prioritise “getting research 
done” over producing sound scientific methodology. If true, then this is a 
major problem – accumulation of published evidence of variable quality 
actually hinders our understanding. It appears that a lot of patients may 
have been exposed to an intervention without anything useful being 
learned. 
The inference however illustrates a common misconception in medical 
literature: a study that does not return a statistically significant result 
is not a failed trial. The purpose of a trial is to produce clinical data to reject 
the null hypothesis and accept the alternative of inequality (between 
the groups) in the vast majority of situations. On occasion, other 
alternative hypotheses for superiority, non-inferiority and equivalence 
are examined, the latter two being examples of the recommended use 
of one-sided hypothesis testing. The trial is not somehow to simply 
validate the authors` original estimate of the treatment effect. Put 
simply, the statistics are not the ultimate aim of the study, the data is.
Let us examine the power or sample size calculation in a bit more detail: 
power is “the probability of a study of a given sample size correctly 
identifying a true difference or effect in the populations studied”. It is 
also the probability of rejecting a false null hypothesis.3 To perform the 
sample size calculation for a trial, investigators must first define the 
primary endpoint. They should also define in their prospective statistical 
analysis plan whether the primary endpoint is to be characterised in 
proportions or as continuous or ordinal data. So, this might be a change 
in prevalence of a categorical outcome (say, incidence of a defined 
complication after surgery) or a change in the average (or median) value 
of a continuous endpoint such as peak serum creatinine or length of 
hospital stay. They then set the required power (typically 80 or 90%) and 
level of significance (“the probability of rejecting the null hypothesis in 
a statistical test when it is in fact true”) usually 5%.4 Next, they draw on 
previous published studies or pilot data of their own to estimate a likely 
event rate or average value (and the typical distribution around this 
value) for the control group. 
Finally they need to make an estimate as to how much difference 
the intervention might make, that is, to define a Minimum Clinically 
Important Difference. The study then sets out to measure the likelihood 
that the intervention does in fact make this much difference.. Nontshe`s 
description of these steps in the paper somewhat blurs the distinction 
between the two different common sample size calculations (for 
continuous data and proportions, although both can be harmonised by 
framing them as “standardised differences”) but their overall message is 
that there are two crucial elements: 
1. Do the statistics support the notion that the intervention makes a 
difference? 
2. How much difference? 
We should all be asking ‘How much of an effect is there?’ rather than 
simply ‘Is there an effect?’5 This second element requires judgement 
on the part of the investigators and the reader as to whether this 
amount is plausible and actually important in clinical practice. It 
seems imperative that investigators give their sample size calculation, 
as Nontshe et al. put it, “thoughtful and realistic consideration.”1 Yet in 
13 of the 28 trials detailed in their review, no justification for the 
estimated treatment effect was provided in the methods section. Only 
two studies explicitly cited pilot or observational data. Nontshe and 
colleagues do not describe how much effort was made to contact 
the original authors to find out more about the source of the MCID 
estimation. It is of course possible that some of the 13 in fact drew on 
pilot data, and that sufficient detail might be found in the protocols of 
these investigations, but this should be describedalso in the published 
study report.
Twelve (12) of the included RCTs cited previously published studies to 
justify their apriori assumption about effect size. Differences in inclusion 
criteria, intervention and endpoints might affect applicability of these 
to the authors’ own cohort. Full disclosure helps the clinician reading 
the paper to put the data in context, rather than simply focus on the 
mathematics of the P-value or confidence interval. 
The evidence based way that medical practice evolves is that new (or 
old) interventions are put to the test, usually against current practice 
(control) in a clinical trial. Statistics is a kind of mathematical language 
to help us understand probability, which can be applied to data to make 
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some sense of it. Indeed the terms ‘statistical test’ and ‘test statistic’ 
are actually misnomers. It is hypotheses that are tested not statistics. 
We use statistical methods to estimate probabilities and confidence 
intervals and then check if is there enough evidence to accept or reject 
the hypothesis under test. Indeed, these authors would prefer if we 
deleted the term ‘test’ from virtually all the usual statistical tests and 
use terminology such as analysis of variance (ANOVA), Kruskal-Walllis 
one-way analysis, Student t-distribution, correlation and regression, 
etc. The problem is that very few doctors understand the language. As 
it turns out, most authors of scientific papers in anaesthetic journals do 
not understand it either. Statisticians themselves appreciate that they 
are applying probabilistic models rather than measuring degrees of 
certainty, but these concepts seem difficult for clinicians to grasp. This 
is not a new insight. A comprehensive misunderstanding of statistics 
is rife in the medical literature and has prompted something of a print 
backlash from statistical experts and journal editors.5-8
Some journals have even placed an outright ban on P-values, which, 
unfortunately, is akin to ‘shooting the messenger’. Fisher, the founder 
of the P-value intended it only as an informal way to judge whether 
evidence was significant in the old-fashioned sense: worthy of a 
second look.5 Whilst reassuringly simple, it has instead somehow been 
misappropriated into a threshold which is applied rigidly to data – 
usually along the lines of “if the P-value is < 0.05 then you have found 
something significant (and if not, you have not ). ”This stems from 
what behavioural economists call “fast” thinking: an endeavour to 
rapidly weigh up available information and come up with a summary 
overall judgement which is usually rather black or white.9 Such a 
decisive approach is often helpful in the practice of clinical medicine. 
Unfortunately, when applied to critical appraisal of scientific literature it 
is wholly misleading. The problem is not with the P-value, it is with the 
lack of understanding of the reader.
What is a P-value? It is the probability that the difference or effect size 
observed (or one more extreme) will occur under the null hypothesis. 
Consider an example from Nuzzo`s excellent 2014 essay in Nature on 
the slippery nature of statistics5: Data from a large study seemed to 
show that extremists quite literally saw the world in black and white. 
Political moderates saw shades of grey much more accurately than 
did people with extreme left or right wing views. The P-value was 0.01. 
Many scientists looking at that would interpret it as showing a highly 
significant finding, very unlikely to be due to random chance. 
But they would be wrong. The P-value cannot say this. All it can do is 
summarise the data in relation to a specified null hypothesis. The P-value 
here says that if it is true there is no difference between how accurately 
extremist and moderates see colours, then there is a 1% chance of 
having observed this result. This is not at all the same as saying there`s 
only a 1% chance that it is a false alarm. If we were to repeat the whole 
experiment under similar conditions there is a substantial chance of 
getting a different result. Indeed the investigators in Nuzzo`s real life 
example decided to repeat the study and this time the P-value came 
out at 0.59, not even close to the conventional level of significance. This 
is an example of what statisticians call a “replication” problem. The crux 
is that the statistical value by itself cannot make statements about the 
underlying reality. What is missing is another piece of information: the 
probability that a real effect was there in the first place. In clinical studies 
this is a matter to be addressed by clinical experts with knowledge of 
the clinical area being addressed by the trial. An effect has got to be 
plausible, or else it does not matter how many zeros there are after the 
decimal point in the P-value. 
Since statistical analyses are usually misinterpreted, one may wonder 
what if anything these analyses do for science.8 Indeed, there is a ground 
swell of clinician investigators who suggest that because medicine is so 
complex, it is just about impossible to construct experimental models 
which control all circumstances that might affect outcome apart from 
the study intervention itself, and we should therefore abandon classic 
scientific trials as a means to advance knowledge.10 In response, others 
explain that it is called evidence-based medicine for a reason.11
There are however some ways of reporting and reading clinical trials that 
might help. To avoid the trap of thinking about results as only significant 
or not significant, for example, if researchers always report effect sizes 
and confidence intervals then the reader can readily see the magnitude 
and relative importance of an effect. 
It is useful also not to ignore all previous research. Bayesian analysis is 
a mathematical way of doing this, and is becoming more prominent. In 
essence, one decides by separate means, incorporating what is already 
known (and with a certain degree of subjectivity) what the probability 
is that the null hypothesis is true or false, and then considers how much 
the result of new evidence (in one direction or another) affects one’s 
continuing belief in this likelihood. 
Perhaps most useful is the “effect size ratio”, a quick calculation to help 
us judge claims of inequality (semantically “superiority” is commonly but 
erroneously used – this is a one-sided hypothesis) based on a finding in 
a clinical trial.12
Figure 1. Effect Size Ratio. MCID = minimum clinically important 
difference 
If the effect size ratio is > 1, then you are seeing something where the 
effect is at least as large as the investigators estimated before the study. 
In contrast if < 1 then by the authors own criteria the observed effect 
is too small to be important. The effect size ratio is independent of the 
statistical analysis. It is also a quick way to check the methodological 
rigour of the study, as it can only be applied to primary outcomes (it 
relies on the MCID from the original sample size calculation). This 
therefore eliminates all secondary endpoints from consideration and so 
guards against data trawling. Further, since it is a ratio, it requires that 
numerator and denominator have the same units. Thus when reporting 
the primary outcome investigators have to stick with the same variable 
in the same metric as was specified in the study protocol. Only 10 
(36 %) of the trials in Nontshe`s review1 potentially have an effect size 
ratio > 1, although for some the calculation might still not be possible, 
if for example the primary outcome was reported as a proportion (e.g. 
number of patients with severe postoperative pain) when the protocol 
specified a value (e.g. average pain score).
The main limitation of the effect size ratio is that the authors may not 
have set a realistic MCID. If an artificially low value was used then an 
effect size ratio > 1 might not be meaningful, although, unless the 
sample size is very large, smaller MCIDs are less likely to produce 
statistically significant differences in the primary endpoints. 
We should point out that an effect size ratio < 1 does not imply bad 
science. It is part and parcel of experimental research that little or no 
effect size ratio =             
  point estimate of observed effect
  MCID specified in the a priori power calculation
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effect may be found, despite expectations. This gets back to our original 
point that the whole purpose of conducting a trial is to measure the size 
of a previously unknown intervention effect, not to somehow help the 
investigators toward a significant result on a statistical analysis. 
So then what is new in this article? Earlier commentaries have also 
highlighted miscalculation of power.13 This well constructed paper by 
Nontshe and colleagues serves simply to show that it is still rife. It is 
really the job of journal editors and expert reviewers to make sure that 
when there are obvious discrepancies between sample size calculations, 
effect sizes and power, these are addressed during the review process 
and where relevant commented upon as limitations in the discussion 
section of the study report.  It would of course be best if the authors paid 
more attention to MCID estimation in the first place. Ultimately readers 
themselves should look closely at the data and judge the apparent study 
findings in the light of their plausibility, how they sit with what was 
previously already known and whether this has implications for their 
own clinical practice. 
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